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More Than Just Contrarians : 
Insider Trading in Glamour and Value Firms 
 
Abstract 
This study examines the patterns of, and long-run returns to, directors’ (insiders’) trades 
along the Value/Glamour continuum in all stocks listed on the main London Stock Exchange 
from 1986-2003, and analyzes what these directors’ trades add to a “naïve” value-glamour 
strategy. We consider alternative definitions of “value” in defining trades and in the 
construction of our benchmark portfolios so that directors’ trades are evaluated net of any 
value-glamour effect, variously defined.  We find that directors consistently trade in a 
contrarian fashion, buying more “value” stocks and selling more “glamour” stocks, with 
purchases following price falls and sales following price rises. Directors’ “buy” signals in 
“value” stocks generate significant positive abnormal returns while the “sell” signals in 
“glamour” stocks generate smaller and generally insignificant negative returns. In contrast to 
the results from US studies, we find that the positive abnormal returns in “value” stocks 
persist for up to two-years after the initial directors’ trading signal.  Abnormal returns are 
particularly concentrated in smaller value stocks, and are robust to alternative definitions of 
“value”. 
Keywords:  Insider trading, value, glamour 
JEL classification: G14 
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I Introduction 
It is well-known that value stocks have higher returns than glamour stocks in the US 
(Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) and internationally (Fama and French, 1998). In 
addition there is evidence that corporate insiders can trade profitably on their private 
information (Ravina and Sapienza, 2010; Friederich et al. 2001; Gregory, Matatko and 
Tonks, 1997). This paper investigates the interaction of the value-growth anomaly with the 
returns to insider trading, to see whether corporate insiders recognise the publicly available 
value-glamour return differences as mis-pricings and trade on them. In particular, we assess 
whether corporate insiders’ private information is able to generate additional abnormal profits 
over and above trading on value-glamour mis-valuations.   Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and 
Jenter (2005) have examined this question for the US stock market but produce conflicting 
results as to whether any abnormal returns remain to insider trading, once an allowance is 
made for the size and value premia. Our study provides additional out-of-sample evidence for 
a different stock market, and in doing so provides confirmation that the value-growth 
anomaly is based on mis-pricing rather than value stocks being riskier investments.  
Our results can be summarised as follows.  First, we find evidence in the pattern of UK 
directors’ trades that is consistent with a contrarian view of the mis-valuation of value and 
glamour stocks: directors of value firms tend to buy into their own company stock, and 
directors of glamour stocks are net sellers.  Second, UK corporate insiders generate abnormal 
returns over and above a simple contrarian strategy of buying value stocks and selling 
glamour stocks.   Third, we show that these returns appear to be concentrated in small value 
stocks in particular.  Fourth we show that our results are robust to alternative measures of 
value-glamour stocks. These results are difficult to reconcile with a view that such stocks are 
fundamentally riskier, unless one accepts that directors in such companies have particularly 
risk-seeking utility functions. 
We go considerably further than the extant US studies in investigating whether directors trade 
in a contrarian fashion, by considering alternative definitions of “value”. We assess the 
returns to directors’ trading relative to cash-to-price (CF/P), earnings-to-price (E/P) and 
dividend-to-price (D/P), in addition to the book-to-market (B/M) measure of value employed 
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in the earlier papers1. These definitions CF/P, E/P and D/P have all been suggested as 
alternatives to B/M for identifying value stocks. Dissanaike and Lim (2010) show that cash 
flow measures generate stronger risk-adjusted returns than either book value or earnings 
based measures, an effect that persists for two years post portfolio formation.  We specifically 
consider the D/P ratio as companies with high dividend yields have been shown to 
outperform companies with low dividend yields2, and this is a classification of “value” that 
has not be considered by any US study.  It may be the case that sectional sorts on dividend 
yields could give rise to quite different classifications to those obtained using CF/P and E/P 
ratios, as dividends cannot take on a negative value although yields can be zero. Both 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) form portfolios based on cumulated past trades 
over a number of months and compute only the buy-and-hold returns.  Ravina and Sapienza 
(2010) also utilize a buy and hold abnormal return metric, but relative only to market returns. 
We improve on the measurement of long-run returns by computing a range of long-run return 
metrics including both buy-and-hold returns, and calendar time returns in a monthly event 
study framework where the event month is the month of the announcement of the trade. 3 
In the next section we review the literature on the value premium and its relationship with 
studies of insider trading, allowing us to develop our hypotheses. In Section III we explain 
our methodology to examine the interaction of directors trading with contrarian investment 
strategies, and Section IV describes the data set on UK corporate insider trades in all stocks 
listed on the main London Stock Exchange over the period 1986-2003. We present the results 
in Section V, and Section VI provides our conclusions.  
                                                     
 
1 Lakonishok and Lee (2001) use only the B/M ratio while Jenter (2005) uses CF/P and E/P in analysing patterns 
of trading but only the B/M in analysing the long-run returns. 
2 Levis (1989), Morgan and Thomas, (1998) and Dimson et al. (2003) show that for the UK there is a strong 
correlation between D/P and the average monthly return.  For the US similar results are obtained by Dreman 
(1998) and Arnott (2003). 
3 Due to space considerations we mainly report calendar time returns. However, when we use the B/M ratio to 
define “value”, we additionally report BHARs for comparison with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter 
(2005). 
  
5 
II Literature Review and Development of Hypotheses  
Contrarian investment strategies 
Contrarian investment strategies, buying (selling) stocks with low (high) prices relative to 
fundamentals, as an investment strategy has existed for the past 70 years, but confirmation of 
its existence was in large part due to the work of Fama and French (1992 and 1995) and 
Lakonishok et al. (1994).4  While some authors (Kothari et al., 1995; Black, 1993 and 
MacKinlay, 1995) have argued that these observed premiums are artefacts of the 
methodology adopted, due to survivorship bias, beta mis-measurement and data snooping, the 
wealth of international evidence discounts this argument.5  However the interpretation of the 
value premium is contentious, and there are two commonly accepted, but conflicting, 
explanations. One is a rational risk-pricing explanation (Fama and French, 1998), suggesting 
that because value stocks are fundamentally riskier than glamour stocks (Zhang, 2005), they 
therefore deliver greater returns as compensation for bearing that risk. The second 
explanation is based on the irrational behavioural of investors (Lakonishok et al., 1994). The 
central idea behind this school of thought is that investors systematically overestimate the 
potential of growth firms to produce superior returns and these systematic errors are 
responsible for the superior performance of value stocks.  Dissanaike and Lim (2010) 
investigate the performance of a range of portfolio formation devices, ranging from simple 
sorts on book value, cash flow and earnings measures, to more complex models employing 
variants of the Ohlson (1995) model and a residual income model (RIM) over the formation 
period 1987 to 2001.  Whilst a version of the Ohlson model and the RIM are the two best 
                                                     
 
4 Investment strategies which involve buying (selling) value (glamour) stocks with low (high) prices relative to 
fundamental measures of value like book value, earnings, cash flow, dividends or sales can be traced back to 
Graham and Dodd (1934).  These papers elaborated on the ideas and evidence uncovered by Stattman (1980) 
and  Rosenberg et al.(1985) on the relation between cross section of returns and the B/M, and by Basu (1983) on 
the importance of the E/P in explaining returns. 
5 Fama and French (1998) show that the value premium is a truly international phenomenon. The “value” effect 
has been observed in Japan (Chan et al. 1991), in European countries (Capaul et al., 1993; Brouwer et al., 1997; 
Forner and Marhuenda, 2003; Antoniou, Galariotis, and Spyrou, 2005), and in the UK (Levis and Liodakis, 
2001; Gregory et al., 2001;, Dimson et al., 2003; Dissanaike and Lim, 2010). 
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performing models, portfolio sorts on cash flow measures are not far behind. As the authors 
conclude (p. 251) “Our most intriguing finding is that simple cash flow multiples appear to 
have almost as much power in predicting future contrarian profits as the more sophisticated 
alternatives”.   
Trading by Corporate Insiders 
Although early work on corporate insider transactions by Jaffe (1974), Finnerty (1976) and 
Seyhun (1986) identified a stock price reaction to these trades, more recently Lakonishok and 
Lee (2001) find little evidence of any announcement effect of insider trading. Pettit and 
Venkatesh (1995) suggest that corporate insiders’ desire to disguise any informed trading 
means that it is more likely that they will trade on the basis of information that is only 
revealed in the long-run.6  Lakonishok and Lee (2001) find some evidence of long-run 
abnormal returns after conditioning on size and book-to-market characteristics of the firms. 
But Jenter (2005) concludes that long-run excess returns, after controlling for size and book-
to-market effects, are indistinguishable from zero.  These somewhat mixed findings on the 
stock market response to corporate insider transactions in the US are in contrast to the UK 
and other countries where studies have shown there are significant short-run and long-run 
abnormal returns to directors’ trading (Gregory et al., 1997; Friederich et al, 2001; Bris, 
2005; Fidrmuc et al., 2006; Betzer and Theissen, 2009).  Fidrmuc et al. (2006) explain the 
greater short-run informativeness of UK directors’ trades in terms of the regulatory 
differences between the two markets, because prior to 2002 the required disclosure of insider 
trades to the market was faster in the UK.  Brochet (2010) confirms this conjecture that the 
disclosure regime does have an impact on short-run stock returns. He finds that after the more 
                                                     
 
6 Throughout this paper we use the term directors to refer to both executive and non-executive board members. 
Trades by corporate insiders in the US and UK are legal provided they are not trading on “material, non-public 
information” (Securities and Exchange Act, 1934) or “price-sensitive information” (UK Criminal Justice Act 
1993). 
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timely disclosure of US insider trades under SOX 2002, abnormal returns and trading around 
filings of insider stock purchases were significantly greater after SOX than before.7   
Interaction of insider trading and contrarian strategies 
If glamour firms either underperform and/or value firms outperform in the long-run, then we 
might expect corporate insiders to trade to take advantage of any perceived mis-valuation. 
However, buying value stocks and selling glamour stocks would be a simple contrarian 
strategy which one might expect to see taking place in the absence of any information from 
insider trades. Whether such strategies generate genuine abnormal returns, net of any risk 
effects, remains controversial in the absence of a wholly convincing asset pricing model.  We 
attempt to provide insights into this controversy by examining the abnormal returns over and 
above those that might accrue to a simple value-glamour contrarian strategy.   
There are good reasons to believe that managers may engage in such contrarian strategies. 
There is evidence from the corporate finance literature on the relationship between market 
mis-valuations and corporate events like IPOs, mergers, SEOs and share repurchases with 
managers adopting strategies to take advantage of these mis-valuations8.  If these events are 
motivated at least in part by their beliefs on the market’s valuation or mis-valuation then it is 
entirely plausible that they will trade strategically when trading on their own accounts in their 
companies’ stocks9.  So an analysis of insider trading patterns across value and glamour firms 
provides interesting prima facie evidence on whether or not “value” firms are so priced 
because they are simply riskier, in which case we would not expect to see directors trading 
any differently between value and glamour categories, or whether such pricing (at least in the 
                                                     
 
7 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (SOX) changed US insider trading reporting requirements, to a faster reporting 
regime, but the results in Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter, (2005) relate to the pre-SOX trade disclosure 
environment. 
8 Ritter (1991), Loughran and Ritter (1995) for SEOs, Ikenberry et al. (1995b) for share repurchases. Dong et al. 
(2006), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), Ang and Cheng (2006), for mergers. Lowry (2003), Schultz (2003), 
Gregory, Guermat and Al Shawawreh (2010) for IPOs. 
9 For example, Jenter (2005) specifically analyses the connection between insider trading, scaled price ratios and 
secondary equity issues. 
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case of the sub-group of firms in which insiders trade) looks like mis-valuation. Of course, 
the basic assumption underlying this is that directors who buy in “value” stocks are unlikely 
to want to load up more on risk than those who buy in other stocks.  
There is evidence from US studies that insiders indeed trade in a contrarian fashion. Rozeff 
and Zaman (1998), Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) all find that corporate 
insiders tend to be net purchasers of value stocks. Jenter (2005) documents that managers in 
low B/M, E/P and CF/P ratios sell off shares “more frequently and aggressively” than 
managers in firms with high values for these ratios, and concludes that the risk compensation 
argument is not consistent with his evidence, since it is unlikely that company executives as 
sophisticated contrarian investors would be loading up on a risk factor. 
Lakonishok and Lee (2001) also analyse the relationship between long-run returns and firm 
characteristics by calculating the abnormal returns conditioned on size and B/M and find 
some evidence of long-run abnormal returns in terms of the spread between buys and sells at 
the 12-month horizon, but this spread is reduced at longer horizons, and when size and book-
to-market benchmarks are included. They note that the (p.103) “biggest spread in returns for 
small, low B/M stocks. In this segment, which is composed of small growth stocks, insiders 
tend to sell. However when they buy, the abnormal returns are substantial, 7.2%. Insiders 
seem to know when to buy.” Lakonishok and Lee (2001 p.109) also conclude that it is 
unlikely that a risk pricing explanation is correct. They note that “it is hard to imagine that 
companies with extensive insider purchases are substantially riskier in the first year following 
the trading than they are in the second year”. 
Jenter (2005) also considers the long-run returns to corporate insider trades but finds that 
although corporate insiders in the US do act as contrarians, and are more likely to buy value 
stocks and sell glamour stocks, there are no excess returns to these strategies when 
appropriate size and value benchmarks are included.  He concludes that his results are 
consistent with Lakonishok and Lee (2001) that in the US there are no abnormal returns to 
corporate insider trading.  However, Lakonishok and Lee have a somewhat different 
interpretation of their results, claiming that firms with intensive insider buying activity 
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outperform companies with extensive sale activity, although they acknowledge that 
development of a profitable trading strategy is “not straightforward” given that the 
differences in returns are concentrated in smaller stocks.  Most recently, Ravina and Sapienza 
(2010) analyze a sample of US insiders’ trades over the period 1986-2003 and, in addition to 
confirming that insiders act as contrarians, find that overall insiders earn a market adjusted 
return of 12.1% over 180 days following their purchases, with independent directors (or non-
executive directors in UK terms) earning 2.12% less over the same period. 
We argue that a conventional “event study” approach is likely to be the most informative 
approach in a UK context, and indeed would be more informative for US trades post 
Sarbanes-Oxley.  The dispersion of financial year-end dates is more diverse in the UK than 
the US10, and given that the presence of proscribed trading periods could result in the 
clustering of trades, we concentrate on the calculation of calendar time abnormal returns in 
our study.   
From the discussion above, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
H1. Corporate insiders buy more shares in value firms than in glamour firms, and sell 
more shares in glamour firms than value firms, irrespective of the valuation ratio used to 
classify the firm into value and glamour categories. 
H2. If corporate insiders utilise more than a naïve contrarian strategy, then insider buy 
trades should generate higher positive long-run returns than their value-controlled 
benchmarks and their sell trades should generate more negative long-run returns than 
their value-controlled benchmarks. 
The premise in our tests is that company directors, with their in-depth knowledge of 
corporate affairs, can form a better assessment of the true long-run value of their firm than 
                                                     
 
10 For example, Agarwal and Taffler (2008) note that 22% of UK firms have March year-ends, with only 37% 
having December year-ends. 
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the market.  If so, they should trade in the opposite direction to any perceived market mis-
valuations in general, and any mis-valuations along the value/glamour continuum in 
particular, so generating abnormal returns from their trades if and when such mis-valuations 
are eventually corrected.  However, if corporate insiders are simply following a naïve 
contrarian strategy then we would not expect them to outperform on a risk or style adjusted 
basis.   
III Methodology 
Creating the value-glamour groups and the corresponding benchmark portfolios. 
To analyze the patterns of insider trading and the long-run returns we group our sample firms 
into glamour and value groups based on alternative definitions of “value”. In the case of the 
B/M ratio we do this in two ways. First, we form 5 groups sorted solely on value namely: 
Q1G; Q2; Q3; Q4; and Q5V. Q1G is the group of extreme glamour firms and Q5V is the group of 
extreme value firms. Second, we form 6 groups based on both size and B/M ratio. However, 
for our analysis of this second sort, we drop the two middle groups and concentrate on the 
four remaining ones, namely a small-glamour group (QSG), a small-value group (QSV), large-
glamour group (QLG), and a large-value group (QLV). This method grouping by size and the 
valuation ratio allows us to examine how the patterns of trading and returns vary between 
glamour and value groups for groups of small and large size firms. For CF/P, E/P and D/P we 
perform our analysis using the second method where we consider both size and the valuation 
ratio when forming the groups.  Specifically, the groups are formed by allocating our sample 
to control (benchmark) portfolios each year based only on the valuation ratio (for B/M only) 
or both size and valuation ratio (for all the value/glamour benchmarks).  
The benchmark portfolios are formed in the January of each year. In constructing these 
portfolios we only use constituents of the FTSE All Share index. Following Dimson et al. 
(2003), we do not consider Fledgling stocks, AIM stocks and other unlisted securities. 
Following the usual convention (Michou et al., 2007), the B/M ratio is calculated using book 
values from a financial year-end at least 6 months prior to the portfolio formation date, and 
form portfolios as at January 1st each year. Thereafter, we follow the methodology in 
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Gregory et al. (2001) for the construction of the size and B/M benchmark portfolios. Each 
year, we first sort the firms on the market capitalization in January.  As a proxy for the NYSE 
breakpoints used in the US Fama-French factors, we then use 50th percentile of the market 
capitalization of the largest 35011 firms to separate the firms into small and large firms. After 
grouping companies into small and large companies we independently sort the firms on the 
basis of the B/M ratio and use the 30th and 70th percentile values of the value ratio of the 
largest 350 companies to form three value groups. The 6 size and B/M groups are then 
formed by the intersection of these two independent sorts12.  
Finally, the benchmark portfolios based on earnings-price (E/P), cash flow to price (CF/P) 
and dividend yield (DY) are formed by using independent sorts on size and the valuation 
ratio using exactly the same construction described above for the size and B/M portfolios. 
Analysing patterns of insiders’ trading 
To analyse the patterns of trading by insiders we compute 6 measures of insider trades on a 
monthly basis. These are: 1) net purchase ratio (npr); 2) net number ratio (nnr); 3) net value 
ratio (nvr); 4) frequency of net trades (freqnet); 5) net number of shares traded (nonet); and 6) 
net value of the shares traded (valnet). The npr is calculated as (Number of Purchase 
Transactions – Number of Sale Transactions)/( Number of Purchase Transactions + Number 
of Sale Transactions), and nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using number of shares 
traded and the value of shares traded per month. We then analyse how these measures change 
as we move from glamour to value groups. If insiders do trade in a contrarian fashion we 
would expect these measures to be smaller for glamour firms than for value firms.  
Measuring long-run returns 
                                                     
 
11 The logic of the largest 350 is to mimic the structure of the FTSE 350 index, which many larger UK fund 
managers view as the limit of the tradable universe in the UK.  Because the index only commenced in 1992, the 
largest 350 firms is employed as a proxy for that index back to 1986. 
12 For the construction of the 5 groups based on the B/M ratio we simply sort by the B/M ratio, then form 
quintiles of the B/M and finally allocate the sample firms to the appropriate quintile each year. 
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Since our portfolio returns are measured in terms of long-run returns, the metrics we use to 
calculate abnormal returns to directors’ trades should be robust to the problems of estimation 
and inference of long-run returns. We follow the recommendation in Lyon et al. (1999) and 
use both event-time and calendar-time methods. For event time methods we define the month 
of announcement of the trade as the event month, and compute buy-and-hold returns 
(BHARs) over the following 6, 12, 18 and 24 months. In drawing inference from the BHARs 
we use the skewness adjusted bootstrapped t-test (Lyon et al., 1999). However, given recent 
evidence on the difficulties posed in making statistical inferences based upon BHARs 
(Mitchell and Stafford, 2000; Ang and Zhang, 2004), we place most emphasis on the calendar 
time abnormal returns (CTARs). For the calendar time returns, Ang and Zhang (2004) show 
that the Fama-French three factor model is well-specified and has reasonable power to detect 
abnormal returns at shorter horizons. Importantly, they show that inferences drawn using the 
weighted least squares (WLS) approach demonstrate superior performance to a simple OLS 
approach.  They also show that the four-factor Carhart model performs considerably less well 
in their simulations. Accordingly, we follow the advice in Ang and Zhang (2004) and employ 
a FF-CTAR13 methodology with inferences drawn using WLS.   
Measuring long-run returns using GLS Calendar time method using Control portfolios 
While the abnormal returns computed using the FF-CTAR model discussed above are those 
that would be observed net of any simple value-glamour effects, these returns are capable of 
two interpretations.  If the Fama-French model adequately describes the cross-section of 
expected stock returns, then the significant abnormal returns shown above are net of any risk 
effects.  Alternatively, if we observe mis-pricing, then the abnormal returns observed are 
those over and above an investment style predicated on size and book-to-market. Where we 
use alternative definitions of value, a more appropriate method would be to incorporate the 
                                                     
 
13  The Fama-French factors we use are from the factor source book from Gregory, Harris and Michou (2001) 
and updated in Gregory and Michou (2007). 
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benchmark portfolio (based on the particular definition chosen) returns within the calendar 
time method.  
To this end, we run calendar time regressions using the model employed in Gregory et al 
(2010), controlling for possible heteroscedasticity and allowing for some variation between 
the characteristics of the benchmark portfolio and the characteristics of the event firm 
portfolio.  This approach regresses the relevant directors’ trading portfolio on a size and value 
control portfolio that is directly matched to the value characteristic being investigated.  If the 
benchmark perfectly matches the risk characteristics of the directors’ trading portfolio, then ß 
should be unity.  The innovation in their paper is to allow for heteroscedasticity in the 
CTARs by using a GLS approach.  Assuming an equally weighted portfolio, a  -month 
holding period portfolio return is obtained as 
 
Where tn ,  is the number of firms in the portfolio and 
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itR  is the return of a firm i  that 
experienced an event within the last   months.  The assumption is that the variance of this 
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results being marginally stronger from the GLS method, although inferences from the White 
(1980) approach are qualitatively identical, except where noted.   
IV Data 
We examine directors’ trading in all UK public limited companies undertaken in the period 
1986-2003 listed on the main London Stock Exchange, with returns being accumulated for 24 
months post-trade and for up to 6 months pre-trade. We only consider open market purchases 
and sales of common stock by directors. We eliminate trivial trades by removing trades 
where the absolute value of the net shares traded per month is less than £20,00014. We 
exclude investment in AIM stocks and other unlisted securities from the analysis. We also do 
not consider directors’ trades in investment trusts, property firms, insurance companies and 
banks, which is consistent with Gregory et al. (2001) and Dimson et al. (2003). The directors’ 
trading data which includes the trades of both executive and non-executive directors, is from 
Hemmington Scott Directors’ Trading Database for periods post-1995, but before that are 
from Directus Ltd and hand-collected data as explained in Gregory et al. (1997). Accounting 
data is from Hemmington Scott, supplemented with data from Datastream.  All stock return 
data and market capitalisation data is from the London Business School Share Price Database 
(LSPD). We use the LSPD number, together with the Stock Exchange Daily Official List 
SEDOL numbers for identifying companies when merging the data across these different 
sources, and cross check all merged data to ensure consistency in the calculation of the 
relevant variables. The returns are all adjusted for dividends and capital structure changes. 
One unique feature of this data set is that it includes firms that have become void during the 
period 1985-2006, thereby eliminating any survivorship bias. Nagel (2001) notes that it is 
important to mitigate survivorship bias by including void companies because portfolios 
                                                     
 
14 There are several methods adopted to eliminate trivial trades; these include: number of shares traded 
(Lakonishok and Lee 2001); the value of shares traded; value of shares traded as a percentage of market 
capitalization (Fidrmuc et al. 2006). Fidrmuc et al.  (2006) uses a cut-off of net trade value > 0.1% of market 
capitalization to identify large trades. However, the Fidmuc et al. (2006) method has a serious problem of 
biasing the sample towards smaller companies by eliminating many larger companies. 
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constructed on the basis of accounting data with inherent ex post selection bias do not 
represent trading strategies that are replicable ex ante. We source the FTSE All Share index 
returns and Treasury Bill return data from the LSPD.  
There are a total of 89,774 open market individual trades (63,690 purchases and 26,084 sales) 
by company directors in their company stock across all UK publically listed companies 
(excluding AIM companies and accounting for missing market capitalisations) over the 
period 1986-2003. According to the disclosure rules of the London Stock Exchange, these 
trades are disclosed to the market within 5 days of the trade. We record each director’s trade, 
and at the end of every calendar month we aggregate these individual trades by value across 
directors in the same firm to obtain either a net buy or a net sell monthly trading signal for 
each firm. Applying the various filters and cut-offs explained previously, results in 16,848 
monthly directors’ trading signals (defined as monthly net purchases or sales) over the whole 
sample period, with 54% of those being directors’ buy signals and 46% being directors’ sell 
signals, in terms of the number of transactions. 
V Results 
Value-glamour groups based solely on B/M 
We initially investigate trading patterns and returns by simply classifying firms on the basis 
of B/M quintiles.  Table 1 shows the means and medians of the various insider trading 
measures by these B/M quintiles. We can see that there is a clear pattern in the value of the 
net trades as we move from glamour (Q1G) to value (Q5V) groups, with negative net trades 
(sales) in the glamour portfolio, and positive net trades (purchases) in the value group. This is 
due to both an increase in the value of buys and a decrease in the value of sells as we move 
from the glamour to value groups.  For example, directors’ in the extreme glamour group are 
net sellers with a mean net value of shares traded (valnet) of £533,000, while they are net 
buyers in the extreme value group with mean valnet of £53,910. All other measures of 
directors’ trading such as the net purchase ratio (npr), net number ratio (nnr) and net value 
ratio (nvr) exhibit this same pattern, and is consistent with the hypothesis that directors take a 
contrarian view on the value of their own firms.  What is particularly striking is that 
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whichever measure of trading activity we employ, net directors’ purchases increase 
monotonically as we move through the glamour to value continuum. 
We now move on to the analysis of the long-run returns for the simple quintile grouping. In 
general, the six months pre-event returns (not reported in the tables) are negative, implying 
that directors buy after a fall in prices.  The post trade returns from the FF-CTARs are then 
shown in Table 2.  Our quintiles are numbered from Q1 (glamour) to Q5 (value).  Strikingly, 
we see that for all horizons, abnormal returns are earned in the two “value” portfolios 
following directors’ purchases.  Returns are not significantly different from zero following 
purchases in the “glamour” portfolios, nor are they in the (unreported) middle quintile 
portfolio.  These return patterns carry through to 24 months after the purchase signal, 
although the highest annual percentage rates (APRs) are after 6 months, where the annualised 
return on the Q5V portfolio is 13.22% and that on the Q4 portfolio is 11.48%.  These APRs 
progressively tail off to 9.51% and 11.88% respectively after 12 months, and 7.31% and 
10.03% respectively after 24 months.  Nonetheless, these APRs imply significant abnormal 
returns continue to be earned up to two years after the date of the directors’  trading signal 
itself.  On the “sell” side, abnormal returns are small and insignificant in all cases. 
So far, our results are consistent with those from other studies, in that in general positive 
returns accrue to directors’ trades in the longer run, and that the directors’ purchasing and 
selling patterns seem to be contrarian in nature.  Directors in glamour stocks are more likely 
to be sellers, and those in value stocks to be buyers, with net trades showing a clear pattern of 
contrarian trading.  We now extend our analysis to firms partitioned on the basis of both size 
and book-to-market ratios. 
Value-glamour groups based on Size and B/M 
Table 3 reports the directors’ trade statistics for the different size and value-glamour 
portfolios. We see that value of the net trades increase as we move from the glamour to value 
categories and the other measures of insider trading also illustrate the contrarian nature of 
directors’ trades. As one moves from the small-glamour to the small-value portfolios, we see 
that the median value of the net value of shares traded indicates that insiders go from being 
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net sellers (£34,000) to being net buyers (£23,500). We see a similar pattern for the groups of 
large companies. Based on the median valnet insiders go from being net sellers (£12,200) in 
large-glamour firms to net buyers (£19,500) in large-value firms. The nnr, npr and nvr 
measures present a similar picture in both size categories. 
Again, the crucial question is whether this apparently contrarian trading behaviour is borne 
out by the future returns to these trades. Table 4 shows the BHARs to buy trades based on 
value weighted returns of the size and B/M benchmark portfolios. We emphasise that by 
construction, these event time portfolios have been cleaned of any simple “value-glamour” 
effects, and so these returns can be viewed as net of any style or risk effects.  Directors 
generally buy after negative abnormal returns (the one exception being small-value stocks, 
where pre-purchase abnormal returns are not significant), and these negative abnormal 
returns are followed by significant reversals in the post-trade period.  They sell after 
significant increases in abnormal returns, although the reversal effect here only occurs in the 
case of large-value stocks.  In every case, on the purchase portfolio their trades generate 
significant positive abnormal returns in excess of any pure “value-glamour” effect. However, 
the buy and hold abnormal returns for buy trades show a big differential between the 
abnormal returns generated by value and glamour firms within both the small and large 
categories. On a value weighted basis we find that directors’ buy trades generate abnormal 
returns of 12.65% and 20.01% for small-glamour and small-value firms after 24 months, 
compared to 3.74% and 6.29% for large-glamour and large-value firms. With respect to the 
sell trades in large-value firms we observe that the BHAR is -8.47% after 24 months, and a 
significant -4.06% for the (0, +18) month holding period. It is also worthwhile noting that for 
QLV the proportion of positive return events go from 54.3% to 39.4% as we go from the (-6,0) 
to the (0,24) window.  
However, the calendar time portfolio regressions reported in Table 5 show that only buy 
trades in small-value and large-value firms generate consistently significant positive 
abnormal returns. The abnormal returns observed in the glamour firms when using the event 
time approaches seem to disappear entirely in calendar time. The abnormal returns are 
roughly twice as large in the case of small-value stocks compared to large-value stocks, and 
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again the annualised returns are strongest over the 6 month window, where small-value stock 
trades earn 13.62% compared to large-value stock trades of 6.04%. After 24 months these 
annualised rates fall away to 9.51% and 4.91% respectively.  The calendar time returns 
confirm that directors’ sales as a whole generate returns that are simply insignificant, and  are 
consistent with findings elsewhere, suggesting that directors tend to sell for liquidity and 
portfolio re-balancing reasons. 
The difference in returns using the event time and calendar time approaches has implications 
for pseudo market timing. Chan et al. (2007, p.2675) note that to the extent that any post 
announcement abnormal returns are observed, the critical distinguishing inference of pseudo 
market timing is that one continues to observe abnormal performance in event time but not 
under calendar-time.  Our results with regard to value stocks are supportive of the notion that 
directors seem to have genuine (as opposed to pseudo) market timing ability.  This is 
consistent with the evidence on UK IPOs reported in Gregory et al (2010).15   
In summary, we see that when the B/M ratio is used as an indicator of value, on a size 
adjusted basis, value firms in which directors buy consistently outperform their benchmark 
firms.  When we employ the Fama-French model as the benchmark, thereby controlling for a 
particular form of book to market and size, we find that the result holds only for buy trades in 
small-value and large-value companies. This suggests that insiders in such firms use more 
than a naïve contrarian strategy at least with respect to their buy trades.  
Value-glamour groups based on alternative definitions of value 
In this section we consider earnings yield (E/P), cash flow yield (CF/P), and dividend yield 
(D/P), in addition to B/M, as alternative definitions of value. One might argue that these 
variables, along with B/M, are all highly correlated with one another, and produce a similar 
                                                     
 
15 Chan et al. (2007 p. 2685) notes that the difference in the intercepts between WLS and OLS regressions 
provides an estimate of the explanatory power of pseudo market timing. Given this, we also run OLS 
regressions, although in general we do not report these results given the Ang and Zhang (2004) analysis.   The 
results are interesting. For example with the FF3F model we find that the difference in the intercepts is 1.87% 
(on an annualised basis) for 24 months post trade period. None of the sell trade abnormal returns are significant.   
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dispersion in average returns.  However, several studies have shown that this is not always 
the case16. In the Appendix, we report the correlations between the various valuation ratios to 
check this. Although the correlations are significant, they clearly indicate considerable 
variation between value categories, hence justifying a concern with alternative specifications 
of value classification. It is also worth noting that the correlations are very much in line with 
those reported by Brouwer et al. (1997: p.1360 table 3) and Gregory et al (2001: p.1226 table 
A1)17.  
An interesting issue arises if we wish to evaluate the returns to directors’ trades over and 
above those accruing to a simple value-glamour strategy. We could simply compute 
abnormal returns using the FF-CTAR approach in the previous section, and unreported 
results confirm that the above findings are robust to alternative definitions of value and 
glamour.18   However, one problem with such FF-CTAR regressions is that they do not 
strictly control for our alternative definitions of value and glamour, in that abnormal returns 
are, by construction of the FF factors, being measured relative to a “value” benchmark 
derived from book to market ratios.  Accordingly, when evaluating returns to alternative 
value-glamour definitions we prefer to employ benchmarks based on size and the value 
definition of interest.  Having constructed the appropriate benchmark portfolios, we then run 
the GLS regressions described above.  To provide a full comparison, we start with the 
application of this analysis to our book to market definition of value-glamour. These figures 
are reported in Table 6. It is clear that switching from FF regressions to GLS regressions 
based on characteristic-matched portfolios changes inferences, and indeed this is true for all 
the alternative value-glamour definitions we discuss below.  We emphasise that the results in 
Tables 5 and 6 should be read differently.  If the FF model fully describes the expected cross-
                                                     
 
16 See for example, Gregory et al. (2001) and Dimson et al. (2003). 
17 These papers find a slightly lower correlation only between E/P and CF/P at 0.43 and 0.44 respectively. 
However our correlations are in line with Chan (1991) who report 0.76. Some differences are to be expected as 
our correlations are only for the sample of firms in which directors have traded. 
18 Full results are available from the authors on request. 
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section of expected returns, then the Table 5 results strictly represent the abnormal returns to 
a directors’ trading based rule.  On the other hand, Table 6 captures the returns from this 
trading rule that remain over and above a simple value-glamour investment style.   
 
Turning to the results themselves, on the buy side, we see that the alphas on both small-value 
and small-glamour stocks are significantly positive at all horizons except 24 months in the 
case of the small-glamour stocks.  However, the alphas for the small-value stocks are at least 
twice those of the small-glamour alphas as a minimum, and over three times those of small-
glamour stocks at longer horizons.  We also include a GLS test for differences between the 
value and glamour portfolio returns within each size category, reported in the final column 
for buy and sell trades respectively.  This statistic (VG:pval) is the significance of the alpha 
in a similar GLS regression but on the returns to a long-short portfolio which is long in QSV 
and short in QSG, or which is long in QLV and short in QLG. Here we see that for every horizon 
from 6 to 24 months the small value “buy” portfolio significantly outperforms the small 
glamour “buy” portfolio.  In addition, we now observe that there are no abnormal returns to 
directors’ trading in larger firms over and above a B/M and size value-glamour strategy at 
any horizon.  Neither are there any significant differences between large value and large 
glamour “buy” portfolios.  On the sell side, generally no abnormal returns are observed, 
although paradoxically there are small positive abnormal returns to directors’ sales at short 
horizons in small-glamour stocks.19  However, none of the differences between value and 
glamour “sell” portfolios are significant for any size grouping at any time horizon. 
We now consider each of the alternative valuation ratios in turn starting with the CF/P ratio. 
Table 7 reports trade characteristics for four size and CF/P groups. Here we see that, as we 
move within the small group of companies, the net purchase ratio moves from -0.10 to +0.27. 
Within the large group of large companies we see a similar pattern. The net purchase ratio 
                                                     
 
19 This effect is less significant when OLS with White (1980) corrections are employed. 
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changes from 0.01 to 0.27.  This change in ratios is particularly interesting in the light of the 
Dissanaike and Lim (2010) finding that CF/P provides a strong value signal.  When we 
consider measures relating to the value of the shares traded we find that as we move from 
QSG to QSV the median valnet changes from £25,200 (net sales) to £20,800 (net purchases), 
while within the group of large companies the corresponding values change from £15,268 
(net sales) to £20,240 (net purchases). Thus, as in the case of the B/M ratio, we observe that 
directors adopt a contrarian approach when trading in their own firms.  
Table 8 reports the returns over and above a simple value-glamour strategy with CF/P as our 
value indicator.  On the buy side, results are similar to those obtained using B/M.  Again, 
substantial positive abnormal returns are observed at all horizons for small-value stocks, with 
the monthly alpha ranging from 0.5% at 24 months to 0.9% at 6 months.  However, the 
abnormal return from trades in small-glamour stocks is now significant at close to the 5% 
level after 24 months.  We see that trades in small-value stocks are always significantly 
greater than those in small-glamour stocks, although the magnitude of the difference is less 
than that observed when B/M is the value indicator, and the difference is only significant at 
the 10% level for horizons beyond 6 months.  This smaller difference between value and 
glamour is mainly driven by a stronger abnormal return to directors’ trading in small-glamour 
stocks.  On the sell side, alphas are insignificant, with the exception of the six month positive 
abnormal return on small-glamour stocks,20 and none of the differences between value and 
glamour “sell” portfolios is significant.  
Next we consider the results based on the E/P ratio as the measure of value. Table 9 reports 
the characteristics for the trades partitioned on the basis of size and E/P.  We find that within 
the group of small companies the net purchase ratio changes from 0 to 0.18 as we move from 
the glamour to the value groups. For the large firms this changes from 0.05 to 0.20.  Again, 
we find that insiders are contrarian in that they buy more in value firms and sell more in 
glamour firms. The table shows that as we move from QSG (small-glamour) to QSV (small-
                                                     
 
20 Again, less significant with OLS and White (1980) corrections. 
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value), the value of the net shares traded changes from a median valnet of -£13,825 to a 
median valnet of +£18,774. For the large firms this changes from -£11,405 to +£4,000.  The 
returns over and above a simple value-glamour strategy for the E/P signal reported in Table 
10 yield very similar results to that from the CF/P strategy, except that the abnormal return in 
small-glamour stocks is now highly significant at the 24 month horizon.  Although the 
directors’ trading outperformance in the small-value group is always considerably larger than 
that found in the small-glamour group, the difference is only significant at longer horizons.   
We finally move on to the results using D/P as a measure of value. Table 11 reports various 
directors’ trade related statistics for the four groups. We see the net purchase ratio changes 
from -0.17 in the small glamour group to 0.32 in the small value group, and from -0.12 to 
0.38 in the large glamour and value groups respectively. So again there seems to be a strong 
contrarian trend with respect to the number of transactions. In terms of the net value of the 
shares traded we observe that the median valnet changes from £33,126 (net sales) to £ 22,500 
(net purchases) as we move from glamour to value within the small category and from 
£26,093 (net sales) to £24,514 (net purchases).  Therefore, the pattern for D/P is similar to 
that which we have seen for all the other value to price ratios.  The performance of directors’ 
trades relative to a value strategy based on dividend yield is reported in Table 12.  Results are 
most similar to those of the CF/P strategy, with 24-month returns to the small-glamour firms 
being of only marginal significance, whilst those for the small-value group exhibit highly 
significant abnormal returns.  The difference between small value and small glamour “buy” 
portfolios is always significant, although just outside the 5% level at the 24 month horizon. 
What we learn from comparing directors’ trading returns to the benchmark value strategies 
reported above is that although the scale of the returns varies slightly, there are always 
substantial excess returns to be earned, over and above those obtainable from alternative 
value-glamour strategies, by following directors’ trades in smaller value stocks.  These excess 
returns are generally strongest at the 6 month horizon, where they vary between 100 basis 
points a month relative to a B/M or D/P strategy, down to 80 basis points from an EP 
strategy.  At 24 months, these returns vary between 50 and 60 basis points per month.  
Abnormal returns over the benchmark also accrue to directors’ trades in small-glamour 
  
23 
stocks, although the scale is smaller, and not always significant at the 24 month horizon.  The 
differences in return to following a directors’ trading strategy in small value stocks rather 
than small glamour stocks is generally significant, except in the case of the E/P strategy at 
short horizons.  The implication of our finding that directors’ trades in large-value stocks earn 
positive returns relative to a Fama-French benchmark, yet not relative to a specific value 
strategy, is that some value strategies earn abnormal returns that are not fully priced by the 
Fama-French model.  This is entirely consistent with the results reported in Gregory et al 
(2003), who show that significant alphas accrue to some of the Lakonishok et al (1994) 
trading strategies in the UK, and more recently by Dissanaike and Lim (2010) who also show 
that other UK portfolio formation strategies give rise to abnormal returns that are not priced 
by the Fama-French model. 
VI Conclusions 
We find that UK directors trade as contrarians, buying in value stocks and selling in glamour 
stocks.  We go on to show that UK directors’ purchases generate long-run abnormal returns 
over and above a simple value-glamour trading rule. These abnormal returns increase 
monotonically as we move along the glamour-value continuum. These results are in stark 
contrast to the results for the US, where Lakonishok and Lee (2001) and Jenter (2005) find 
that the long-run returns to insiders’ trades along the glamour-value continuum can be more-
or-less explained by a three-factor model.   
 
The particular contribution of this paper is to analyse specifically what directors’ trades add 
to a “naïve” value-glamour strategy.  We do this by looking at different definitions of “value” 
in defining trades, and also by controlling for different definitions of “value” in our 
benchmark portfolios, so that directors’ trades are evaluated net of any value-glamour effect, 
variously defined.  Having considered various ratios as candidates for defining “value” 
stocks, we find a consistent result from both event time and calendar time methods, that no 
matter how “value” is defined, directors’ purchases in small-value firms generate significant 
abnormal returns, net of any size and value/glamour effects in the benchmarks. These 
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abnormal returns persist for over two-years after the initial directors’ trading signal. Small-
glamour firms do not show superior performance in calendar time, relative to a Fama-French 
benchmark, in contrast to the result obtained by Lakonishok and Lee (2001) for the US. 
However, consistent with that paper we show that there appear to be excess returns for this 
group when benchmark portfolios are formed using alternative definitions of value and 
glamour.  Given that in all cases these returns are those in excess of the returns on a size and 
valuation ratio matched benchmark portfolio, these returns reflect the fact that directors 
indeed use more than a naïve contrarian strategy when trading in their companies’ stock.  
 
Our first set of our calendar time returns measures outperformance relative to the Fama-
French factors, which explicitly assume that book-to-market and size are proxies for risk.  On 
this basis, the abnormal returns to small-value stocks are similar and always highly 
significant across differing “value” categories.   Six-month annual percentage rates (APRs) 
are highest, with an implied APR of 13.62% after 6 months, gradually tailing off to 9.51% 
after 24 months for the B/M definition of value.  Other definitions of value exhibit similar 
patterns. 21  The implication is that substantial abnormal returns continue to be earned for up 
to two years post trade, though the rate of return declines slowly over time.   On this basis, for 
the B/M definition of “value”, we show that directors’ trades in large-value stocks also 
generate abnormal returns over and above a simple value-glamour trading rule, and although 
unreported, this is also true for the CF/P definition.   
 
Our second set of results explicitly compares returns from a directors’ trading strategy to 
those that would result from a simple value-glamour strategy.  These results are not 
contingent on the use of the Fama-French model.  Here the consistent result across all 
definitions of value or glamour is that out-performance is always significant in small-value 
stocks.  For some definitions of “value”, there is also some evidence of out-performance in 
                                                     
 
21 Not reported in this paper, but available from the authors on request. 
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small-glamour stocks, but the scale of this out-performance is far smaller than that found in 
small-value stocks.  Whilst trading costs clearly vary between small and large firms, there is 
no reason to suppose that such costs vary between value and glamour firms within a 
particular size category.  Our evidence for these small-value stocks backs up the Lakonishok 
and Lee (2001) interpretation that insiders who buy such stocks “know what they are doing”.  
 
Taken as a whole, our results confirm that directors’ trading signals clearly generate 
significant positive abnormal returns on the “buy” side, and smaller but typically insignificant 
negative returns on the “sell” side.  An important contribution of our paper is to provide 
corroborating evidence from outside the US that larger abnormal returns are concentrated in 
smaller value stocks in particular.  The major contribution of this paper is to show that these 
returns remain even after controlling for varying definitions of “value” and “glamour”, and 
that this effect is significantly greater in the case of small value stocks.  This seems 
particularly important in the light of the recent evidence in Dissanaike and Lim (2010), which 
shows a substantial variation in the risk-adjusted performance of value strategies.  In 
particular, they show that cash to price measures generate the highest return of any of the 
simple portfolio formation metrics they investigate.  Our results confirm that directors trade 
as contrarians in such firms, a result that seems difficult to reconcile with such returns being a 
proxy for some omitted risk variable.   
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Glamour or Value defined by the B/M ratio 
Table 1: Directors Trade related Statistics for the Directors’ Trading, by B/M Quintiles. 
This table reports the means and median for various directors’ trading related measures for the different groups formed on 
the basis of the B/M ratio. Q1G and Q2 are the glamour groups, Q4 and Q5V are the value groups; freqnet is the net number of 
transactions; nonet is the net number of shares traded; valnet is the net value of the shares traded; npr, nnr and nvr are net 
purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. The npr is calculated as (no. of purchases – no. of sales)/ (no. of 
purchases+ no. of sales); nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using number of shares traded and the value of shares 
traded.  
Group Statistic freqnet 
 net number of 
transactions 
nonet 
net number of 
shares traded 
valnet 
net value of the 
shares traded 
npr 
net purchase 
ratio 
nnr 
net number 
ratio 
nvr 
net value 
ratio 
Q1G 
Mean 0.10 -113,434.00 -533,924.00 -0.07 -0.11 -0.11 
Median -1.00 -8,021.00 -25,000.00 -0.33 -0.99 -0.99 
Q2 
Mean 0.47 -58,082.14 -219,969.10 0.04 -0.01 -0.01 
Median 1.00 -2,757.50 -12,727.50 0.20 -0.38 -0.40 
Q3 
Mean 0.67 -16,584.36 -133,597.10 0.15 0.12 0.12 
Median 1.00 6,000.00 17,868.12 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Q4 
Mean 0.91 26,857.99 7,967.48 0.28 0.25 0.25 
Median 1.00 10,528.50 20,720.78 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Q5V 
Mean 1.17 72,260.99 53,909.70 0.40 0.37 0.37 
Median 1.00 20,000.00 22,805.90 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 2: Alphas from the Fama-French Three factor Calendar Time Portfolio 
Regressions 
This table reports the calendar-time abnormal returns (in decimals) using WLS regressions for 6 months, 12 months, 18 
months and 24 months holding periods. APR is the equivalent annual percentage rate of the monthly abnormal returns. The 
abnormal returns are the α’s from the regression, RPt – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt-Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit . Where SMB is the 
return to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, and HML is the return to a high B/M minus low B/M factor 
mimicking portfolio. Q1G and Q2 are the glamour groups, Q4 and Q5V are the value groups. The symbols *,**, and *** 
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the 
coefficient equals zero. 
 Buys Sells 
Group 6-Month AR APR WLS-t 6-Month AR APR WLS-t 
Q1G -0.11% -1.31 -0.53 0.26% 3.17 1.33 
Q2 0.22% 2.67 1.31 0.06% 0.72 0.38 
Q4 0.91% 11.48 5.05*** 0.13% 1.57 0.79 
Q5V 1.04% 13.22 5.28*** 0.26% 3.17 1.42 
Group 12-Month AR APR WLS-t 12-Month AR APR WLS-t 
Q1G -0.01% -0.12 -0.05 -0.01% -0.12 -0.04 
Q2 0.20% 2.43 1.28 0.02% 0.24 0.12 
Q4 0.76% 9.51 4.84*** 0.04% 0.48 0.29 
Q5V 0.94% 11.88 5.28*** 0.15% 1.81 0.94 
Group 18-Month AR APR WLS-t 18-Month AR APR WLS-t 
Q1G -0.01% -0.12 -0.08 -0.19% -2.26 -1.07 
Q2 0.14% 1.69 0.95 -0.12% -1.43 -0.94 
Q4 0.68% 8.47 4.71*** -0.05% -0.60 -0.35 
Q5V 0.84% 10.56 5.00*** 0.16% 1.94 1.13 
Group 24-Month AR APR WLS-t 24-Month AR APR WLS-t 
Q1G -0.02% -0.24 -0.11 -0.27% -3.19 -1.53 
Q2 0.13% 1.57 0.89 -0.08% -0.96 -0.64 
Q4 0.59% 7.31 4.15*** -0.03% -0.36 -0.21 
Q5V 0.80% 10.03 4.93*** 0.13% 1.57 0.91 
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Table 3: Directors Trade related Statistics for the Size and B/M groups 
This table reports the means and medians for various directors’ trading related measures for the different groups formed on 
the basis of size and B/M ratios. QSG are small-glamour firms, QSV are small-value firms, QLG are large-glamour firms and 
QLV are large-value firms; freqnet is the net number of transactions; nonet is the net number of shares traded; valnet is the 
net value of the shares traded; npr, nnr and nvr are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. The npr is 
calculated as (no. of purchases – no. of sales)/ (no. of purchases+ no. of sales); nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using 
number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. 
Group Statistic freqnet 
 net number of 
transactions 
nonet 
net number of 
shares traded 
valnet 
net value of the 
shares traded 
npr 
net purchase 
ratio 
nnr 
net number 
ratio 
nvr 
net value 
ratio 
QSG 
Mean -0.17 -128,955.20 -491,576.40 -0.15 -0.18 -0.19 
Median -1.00 -15,000.00 -34,000.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
QSV 
Mean 1.07 53,210.52 -10,021.71 0.38 0.36 0.36 
Median 1.00 20,000.00 23,500.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
QLG 
Mean 0.62 -74,307.02 -517,688.40 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
Median 1.00 -2,000.00 -12,200.00 0.33 -0.28 -0.35 
QLV 
Mean 1.16 36,670.28 154,351.10 0.25 0.21 0.21 
Median 1.00 6,300.00 19,500.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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 Table 4: Buy and Hold Abnormal Returns based on Value Weighted returns of Size 
and B/M matched Benchmark Portfolio 
This table reports the mean buy and hold abnormal returns for directors’ buy trades and sell trades, using value-weighted 
size and B/M matched benchmark portfolio returns for 6 months, 12 months, 18 months and 24 months holding periods; % 
pos show the proportion of firms with positive abnormal returns; Boot-t is the skewness adjusted t-statistics. QSG is the 
small-glamour group, QSV is the small-value group, QLG is the large-glamour group and QLV is the large-value group formed 
on the basis of their size and B/M ratios. 
Group Buys Sells 
QSG Mean % pos Boot-t p-value Mean % pos Boot-t p-value 
(-6,0) -3.39% 41.54 -3.74 0.0040 15.87% 68.57 28.44 <.0001 
(0,+6) 2.69% 51.04 2.92 0.0040 2.39% 50.17 3.60 <.0001 
(0,+12) 6.96% 48.89 4.81 <.0001 3.15% 48.02 3.06 0.0020 
(0,+18) 9.82% 47.78 5.01 <.0001 3.53% 44.40 2.54 0.0160 
(0,+24) 12.65% 45.63 5.44 <.0001 3.66% 42.78 2.23 0.0300 
QSV Mean % pos Boot-t p-value Mean % pos Boot-t p-value 
(-6,0) -0.15% 44.09 -0.25 0.7672 8.76% 60.16 13.01 <.0001 
(0,+6) 7.05% 54.71 12.37 <.0001 0.62% 46.69 0.90 0.3157 
(0,+12) 12.26% 54.75 14.24 <.0001 0.82% 44.92 0.76 0.4056 
(0,+18) 16.50% 54.54 15.17 <.0001 1.19% 44.55 0.88 0.3337 
(0,+24) 20.01% 54.92 15.30 <.0001 1.29% 42.49 0.77 0.4156 
QLG Mean % pos Boot-t p-value Mean % pos Boot-t p-value 
(-6,0) -2.34% 44.25 -2.11 0.0739 11.80% 62.81 13.64 <.0001 
(0,+6) -1.10% 45.47 -1.21 0.2278 2.37% 50.98 2.71 0.0040 
(0,+12) 1.12% 49.26 0.86 0.3716 2.71% 49.41 2.15 0.0340 
(0,+18) 1.38% 47.50 0.87 0.3716 2.00% 50.98 1.18 0.2697 
(0,+24) 3.74% 49.53 2.01 0.0480 0.99% 47.46 0.51 0.6094 
QLV Mean % pos Boot-t p-value Mean % pos Boot-t p-value 
(-6,0) -4.32% 38.79 -4.24 0.0020 3.31% 54.27 3.71 <.0001 
(0,+6) 1.23% 46.32 1.28 0.1758 -1.45% 45.73 -1.75 0.0959 
(0,+12) 2.21% 47.14 1.67 0.0959 -1.62% 49.25 -1.38 0.1578 
(0,+18) 4.56% 50.41 2.79 0.0060 -4.06% 44.22 -2.71 0.0120 
(0,+24) 6.29% 48.61 3.37 <.0001 -8.47% 39.45 -4.63 0.0020 
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Table 5: Alphas from the Fama-French Three factor Calendar Time Portfolio 
Regressions for the value-glamour categories defined by B/M 
This table reports the calendar-time abnormal returns (in decimals) using WLS regressions for 6 months, 12 months, 18 
months and 24 months holding periods. APR is the equivalent annual percentage rate of the monthly abnormal returns. The 
abnormal returns are the α’s from the regression, RPt – Rft = αi + βi(Rmt-Rft) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit . Where SMB is the 
return to a small minus big factor mimicking portfolio, and HML is the return to a high B/M minus low B/M factor 
mimicking portfolio. QSG is the small-glamour group, QSV is the small-value group, QLG is the large-glamour group and QLV 
is the large-value group formed on the basis of their size and B/M ratios. The symbols *,**, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% and levels, respectively, for the two-tailed hypothesis test that the coefficient equals 
zero. 
FF3F Buys Sells 
FF3F 6-Month AR APR Wls-t 6-Month AR APR Wls-t 
QSG 0.13% 1.57 0.53 0.20% 2.55 1.09 
QSV 1.07% 13.62 6.07*** 0.20% 2.43 1.18 
QLG -0.28% -3.31 -1.32 0.20% 2.92 1.13 
QLV 0.49% 6.04 2.49** 0.10% 1.69 0.76 
FF3F 12-Month AR APR Wls-t 12-Month AR APR Wls-t 
QSG 0.22% 2.67 0.98 0.00% 0 0.02 
QSV 0.93% 11.75 5.81*** 0.10% 0.84 0.48 
QLG -0.24% -2.84 -1.28 0.00% 0.48 0.19 
QLV 0.48% 5.91 2.77** 0.10% 1.45 0.75 
FF3F 18-Month AR APR Wls-t 18-Month AR APR Wls-t 
QSG 0.17% 2.06 0.81 -0.20% -2.14 -1.05 
QSV 0.83% 10.43 5.45*** 0.10% 0.72 0.45 
QLG -0.21% -2.49 -1.18 -0.10% -1.31 -0.58 
QLV 0.43% 5.28 2.68** 0.00% 0.36 0.22 
FF3F 24-Month AR APR Wls-t 24-Month AR APR Wls-t 
QSG 0.12% 1.45 0.58 -0.20% -2.73 -1.37 
QSV 0.76% 9.51 4.99*** 0.10% 0.96 0.58 
QLG -0.12% -1.43 -0.74 -0.20% -2.37 -1.09 
QLV 0.40% 4.91 2.68** -0.10% -1.19 -0.62 
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Table 6: GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of DT portfolio on Size and B/M 
Matched Control Benchmark Returns 
 
This table reports the results of the GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of directors’ trading portfolio on size and 
B/M matched control benchmark returns. The 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24m represents the holding periods. The α coefficient is the 
intercept in this regression and measures the mean monthly calendar time abnormal returns for the particular holding period; 
β is the coefficient on the size and B/M matched control benchmark in this regression. QSG, QSV, QLG, QLV are the small 
glamour, small value, large glamour and large value portfolios respectively. VG:pval reports the significance of the alpha in 
a similar GLS regression of a log-short portfolio which is long in the small value quintile (QSV)and short in the small 
glamour quintile (QSG);  and a long-short portfolio which is long in the large value quintile (QLV) and short in the large 
glamour quintile (QLG). 
Buy Sell 
Group Coeff 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval  6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG 
β 0.961 33.37 
84.62% 
0.006 
0.953 44.25 
90.95% 
0.369 α 0.004 2.29 0.003 2.51 
QSV 
β 0.975 33.61 
86.22% 
0.900 25.48 
85.63% 
α 0.010 7.12 0.001 1.06 
QLG 
β 1.037 27.92 
72.24% 
0.357 
1.030 23.52 
73.15% 
0.324 α -0.002 -0.81 0.003 1.19 
QLV 
β 0.947 16.78 
70.34% 
1.008 14.67 
78.73% 
α 0.001 0.51 0.000 -0.20 
Group Coeff 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG 
β 0.984 38.39 
87.54% 
0.014 
0.953 44.25 
90.95% 
0.152 α 0.004 2.63 0.003 2.51 
QSV 
β 0.970 39.34 
89.72% 
0.889 26.69 
88.41% 
α 0.008 7.38 0.001 0.57 
QLG 
β 1.086 35.74 
81.00% 
0.406 
1.036 23.52 
75.25% 
0.717 α -0.001 -0.74 0.001 0.41 
QLV 
β 0.943 17.28 
75.36% 
1.012 17.87 
81.36% 
α 0.001 0.45 0.000 -0.10 
Group Coeff 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG 
β 0.990 40.30 
88.97% 
0.008 
0.974 56.66 
93.91% 
0.432 α 0.002 1.99 0.000 -0.49 
QSV 
β 0.950 41.40 
90.73% 
0.891 30.88 
90.15% 
α 0.007 6.72 0.001 0.61 
QLG 
β 1.099 35.86 
82.44% 
0.196 
1.063 26.58 
77.08% 
0.670 α -0.002 -1.10 -0.002 -1.10 
QLV 
β 0.937 17.95 
75.89% 
0.943 17.31 
76.27% 
α 0.001 0.73 -0.001 -0.48 
Group Coeff 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG 
β 0.989 39.22 
88.96% 
0.011 
0.976 64.09 
93.89% 
0.219 α 0.002 1.55 -0.001 -1.17 
QSV 
β 0.937 41.86 
90.72% 
0.886 30.39 
90.55% 
α 0.006 6.15 0.001 0.59 
QLG 
β 1.098 35.38 
84.58% 
0.396 
1.090 27.60 
79.62% 
0.684 α -0.001 -0.43 -0.001 -0.48 
QLV 
β 0.955 18.94 
77.56% 
0.959 18.28 
77.92% 
α 0.001 0.82 -0.002 -1.01 
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Glamour or Value defined by CF/P ratio  
Table 7: Directors Trade related Statistics for the Size and CF/P groups 
This table reports the means and medians for various directors’ trading related measures for the different groups formed on 
the basis of size and CF/P ratios. QSG are small-glamour firms, QSV are small-value firms, QLG are large-glamour firms and 
QLV are large-value firms; freqnet is the net number of transactions; nonet is the net number of shares traded; valnet is the 
net value of the shares traded; npr, nnr and nvr are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. The npr is 
calculated as (no. of purchases – no. of sales)/ (no. of purchases+ no. of sales); nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using 
number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. 
Group Statistic freqnet 
 net number of 
transactions 
nonet 
net number of 
shares traded 
valnet 
net value of  
shares traded 
npr 
net purchase 
ratio 
nnr 
net number 
ratio 
nvr 
net value 
ratio 
QSG 
Mean -0.06 -127,052.30 -484,508.10 -0.10 -0.14 -0.14 
Median -1.00 -10,000.00 -25,200.00 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
QSV 
Mean 0.87 15,515.20 -74,591.81 0.27 0.25 0.25 
Median 1.00 15,000.00 20,800.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
QLG 
Mean 0.60 -66,870.50 -529,953.10 0.01 -0.04 -0.05 
Median 0.00 -3,000.00 -15,268.84 0.00 -0.66 -0.67 
QLV 
Mean 1.18 -2,854.13 -20,612.60 0.27 0.22 0.22 
Median 1.00 6,000.50 20,240.50 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 8: GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of DT portfolio returns on Size and 
CF/P Matched Control Benchmark Returns 
This table reports the results of the GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of directors’ trading portfolio on size and 
CF/P matched control benchmark returns. The 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24m represents the holding periods. The α coefficient is the 
intercept in this regression and measures the mean monthly calendar time abnormal returns for the particular holding period; 
β is the coefficient on the size and B/M matched control benchmark in this regression. QSG, QSV, QLG, QLV are the small 
glamour, small value, large glamour and large value portfolios respectively. VG:pval reports the significance of the alpha in 
a similar GLS regression of a log-short portfolio which is long in the small value quintile (QSV)and short in the small 
glamour quintile (QSG);  and a long-short portfolio which is long in the large value quintile (QLV) and short in the large 
glamour quintile (QLG). 
 
  Buy Sell 
Group Coeff 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.015 41.20 
88.51% 
0.043 
0.981 34.74 
89.10% 
0.304 α 0.005 3.42 0.003 2.57 
QSV  
β 0.945 37.41 
86.48% 
0.898 30.76 
85.97% 
α 0.009 7.01 0.001 1.10 
QLG  
β 1.053 19.16 
71.21% 
0.554 
1.135 22.93 
74.78% 
0.824 α -0.001 -0.39 0.002 0.65 
QLV  
β 1.103 23.96 
74.81% 
1.072 25.73 
77.00% 
α 0.001 0.45 0.001 0.46 
Group Coeff 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.030 46.49 
90.37% 
0.067 
0.998 45.00 
91.73% 
0.809 α 0.005 3.36 0.001 0.93 
QSV  
β 0.957 42.81 
90.48% 
0.903 35.64 
89.23% 
α 0.008 7.26 0.001 1.26 
QLG  
β 1.121 22.82 
78.99% 
0.607 
1.117 21.40 
75.54% 
0.540 α -0.001 -0.51 -0.001 -0.53 
QLV  
β 1.114 29.88 
81.46% 
1.070 29.78 
78.00% 
α 0.000 0.19 0.001 0.32 
Group Coeff 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.006 42.96 
90.36% 
0.069 
0.998 48.60 
92.76% 
0.367 α 0.003 2.55 0.000 -0.34 
QSV  
β 0.954 42.20 
90.83% 
0.914 38.55 
90.57% 
α 0.006 6.21 0.001 0.94 
QLG  
β 1.117 21.75 
79.15% 
0.624 
1.125 23.63 
77.03% 
0.496 α -0.001 -0.54 -0.002 -1.06 
QLV  
β 1.120 29.02 
81.46% 
1.061 28.31 
77.19% 
α 0.000 0.13 0.000 -0.22 
Group Coeff 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.006 41.81 
90.95% 
0.071 
0.998 47.43 
92.50% 
0.246 α 0.002 1.96 -0.001 -0.73 
QSV  
β 0.930 43.13 
91.10% 
0.910 37.03 
91.34% 
α 0.005 5.34 0.001 0.92 
QLG  
β 1.125 22.53 
80.41% 
0.549 
1.163 26.95 
79.74% 
0.579 α -0.001 -0.52 -0.002 -1.23 
QLV  
β 1.107 28.74 
82.15% 
1.070 29.72 
79.58% 
α 0.000 0.31 -0.001 -0.62 
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 Glamour or Value defined by E/P ratio  
Table 9: Directors Trade related Statistics for the Size and E/P groups 
This table reports the means and medians for various directors’ trading related measures for the different groups formed on 
the basis of size and E/P ratios. QSG are small-glamour firms, QSV are small-value firms, QLG are large-glamour firms and 
QLV are large-value firms; freqnet is the net number of transactions; nonet is the net number of shares traded; valnet is the 
net value of the shares traded; npr, nnr and nvr are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. The npr is 
calculated as (no. of purchases – no. of sales)/ (no. of purchases+ no. of sales); nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using 
number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. 
Group Statistic freqnet 
 net number of 
transactions 
nonet 
net number of 
shares traded 
valnet 
net value of 
shares traded 
npr 
net purchase 
ratio 
nnr 
net number 
ratio 
nvr 
net value 
ratio 
QSG Mean 0.12 -86,526.04 -375,099.20 0.00 -0.03 -0.03 
Median 0.00 -5,000.00 -13,825.00 0.00 -0.68 -0.67 
QSV Mean 0.66 -15,033.32 -110,487.60 0.18 0.15 0.15 
Median 1.00 10,000.00 18,774.57 1.00 1.00 1.00 
QLG Mean 0.54 -53,650.26 -469,004.20 0.05 -0.01 -0.01 
Median 1.00 -1,501.50 -11,405.00 0.26 -0.35 -0.33 
QLV Mean 1.02 -20,909.36 -85,663.50 0.20 0.13 0.13 
Median 1.00 4,000.00 17,987.29 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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 Table 10: GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of DT portfolio returns on Size 
and E/P Matched Control Benchmark Returns 
This table reports the results of the GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of directors’ trading portfolio on size and E/P 
matched control benchmark returns. The 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24m represents the holding periods. The α coefficient is the 
intercept in this regression and measures the mean monthly calendar time abnormal returns for the particular holding period; 
β is the coefficient on the size and B/M matched control benchmark in this regression. QSG, QSV, QLG, QLV are the small 
glamour, small value, large glamour and large value portfolios respectively. VG:pval reports the significance of the alpha in 
a similar GLS regression of a log-short portfolio which is long in the small value quintile (QSV)and short in the small 
glamour quintile (QSG);  and a long-short portfolio which is long in the large value quintile (QLV) and short in the large 
glamour quintile (QLG). 
 
    Buy  Sell 
Group Coeff 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.025 39.15 
85.87% 
0.178 
1.011 40.19 
88.00% 
0.674 α 0.005 3.10 0.003 2.08 
QSV  
β 0.969 42.95 
90.39% 
0.889 32.91 
85.40% 
α 0.008 6.97 0.002 1.63 
QLG  
β 0.970 17.98 
66.03% 
0.672 
1.106 20.54 
72.83% 
0.716 α -0.001 -0.44 0.004 1.33 
QLV 
β 1.080 28.42 
74.84% 
0.994 23.52 
77.63% 
α 0.000 0.13 0.002 1.37 
 Grou
p 
Coeff 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.024 51.47 
89.92% 
0.112 
1.028 45.48 
89.49% 
0.984 α 0.005 3.79 0.001 1.13 
QSV  
β 0.978 47.95 
91.76% 
0.900 37.46 
89.27% 
α 0.007 7.62 0.001 1.29 
QLG  
β 1.042 21.60 
74.30% 
0.930 
1.072 20.79 
73.64% 
0.774 α -0.001 -0.35 0.001 0.31 
QLV 
β 1.090 32.63 
81.57% 
1.026 29.45 
82.01% 
α -0.001 -0.31 0.002 1.06 
Group
  
Coeff 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.013 51.28 
90.94% 
0.053 
1.018 45.38 
90.98% 
0.501 α 0.004 3.00 0.000 0.11 
QSV  
β 0.966 47.79 
91.52% 
0.871 20.50 
66.78% 
α 0.007 6.74 0.003 1.35 
QLG  
β 1.073 21.78 
76.70% 
0.536 
1.096 22.38 
74.69% 
0.719 α -0.001 -0.50 -0.001 -0.30 
QLV 
β 1.102 32.40 
82.54% 
1.044 31.19 
81.49% 
α 0.001 0.37 0.000 0.19 
Group
  
Coeff 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.001 46.65 
90.56% 
0.041 
1.010 40.85 
91.20% 
0.967 α 0.003 2.82 0.000 -0.15 
QSV  
β 0.959 46.70 
91.56% 
0.916 42.50 
92.07% 
α 0.006 5.83 0.001 1.32 
QLG  
β 1.103 25.18 
79.15% 
0.524 
1.148 23.82 
77.46% 
0.734 α 0.000 -0.18 -0.001 -0.49 
QLV 
β 1.101 35.18 
83.53% 
1.051 30.37 
82.14% 
α 0.001 0.35 0.000 -0.31 
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Glamour or Value defined by D/P ratio  
Table 11: Directors Trade related Statistics for the Size and D/P groups 
This table reports the means and medians for various directors’ trading related measures for the different groups formed on 
the basis of size and D/P ratios. QSG are small-glamour firms, QSV are small-value firms, QLG are large-glamour firms and 
QLV are large-value firms; freqnet is the net number of transactions; nonet is the net number of shares traded; valnet is the 
net value of the shares traded; npr, nnr and nvr are net purchase ratio, net number ratio, and the net value ratio. The npr is 
calculated as (no. of purchases – no. of sales)/ (no. of purchases+ no. of sales); nnr and nvr are calculated similarly, but using 
number of shares traded and the value of shares traded. 
Group Statistic freqnet 
 net number of 
transactions 
nonet 
net number of 
shares traded 
valnet 
net value of 
shares traded 
npr 
net purchase 
ratio 
nnr 
net number 
ratio 
nvr 
net value 
ratio 
QSG Mean -0.18 -136,643.80 -507,240.30 -0.17 -0.20 -0.20 
Median -1.00 -11,144.50 -33,126.46 -1.00 -1.00 -1.00 
QSV Mean 1.04 19,561.84 -42,369.85 0.32 0.31 0.30 
Median 1.00 16,554.00 22,500.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
QLG Mean 0.07 -92,897.33 -617,816.30 -0.12 -0.17 -0.17 
Median -1.00 -6,602.00 -26,093.92 -0.50 -1.00 -1.00 
QLV Mean 1.53 33,965.18 132,937.40 0.38 0.34 0.34 
Median 1.00 9,251.00 24,518.75 1.00 1.00 1.00 
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Table 12: GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of DT portfolio returns on Size 
and D/P Matched Control Benchmark Returns 
This table reports the results of the GLS regressions of Calendar Time Returns of directors’ trading portfolio on size and D/P 
matched control benchmark returns. The 6, 9, 12, 18 and 24m represents the holding periods. The α coefficient is the 
intercept in this regression and measures the mean monthly calendar time abnormal returns for the particular holding period; 
β is the coefficient on the size and B/M matched control benchmark in this regression. QSG, QSV, QLG, QLV are the small 
glamour, small value, large glamour and large value portfolios respectively. VG:pval reports the significance of the alpha in 
a similar GLS regression of a log-short portfolio which is long in the small value quintile (QSV)and short in the small 
glamour quintile (QSG);  and a long-short portfolio which is long in the large value quintile (QLV) and short in the large 
glamour quintile (QLG). 
 
 
 
 Buy  Sell 
Group Coeff 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 6m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 0.982 33.34 
82.31% 
. 
0.007 
 
0.952 37.19 
89.86% 
0.120 α 0.004 2.17 0.003 2.44 
QSV  
β 0.965 36.79 
87.72% 
0.912 34.53 
85.20% 
α 0.010 8.09 0.000 0.03 
QLG  
β 0.948 22.28 
74.34% 0.910 
 
0.945 18.45 
71.37% 
. 
0.168 
 
α -0.001 -0.50 0.004 1.67 
QLV  
β 1.125 23.00 
73.13% 
1.011 22.07 
75.59% 
α -0.001 -0.33 0.000 -0.14 
Group Coeff 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 12m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.033 39.62 
88.30% 
0.023 
0.967 41.64 
91.42% . 
0.211 
α 0.004 2.88 0.002 1.91 
QSV  
β 0.962 44.72 
91.55% 
0.906 40.45 
88.53% 
α 0.008 8.37 0.000 0.07 
QLG  
β 0.991 22.41 
78.85% 
0.731. 
0.972 19.90 
74.63% 
0.450 α 0.000 -0.18 0.002 0.78 
QLV  
β 1.110 26.78 
79.32% 
1.021 23.52 
77.86% 
α -0.001 -0.72 0.000 -0.24 
Group Coeff 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 18m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.021 38.80 
88.95% 
0.042. 
0.966 46.60 
92.29% 
0.721 α 0.003 2.21 0.001 0.96 
QSV  
β 0.957 50.18 
92.56% 
0.919 43.89 
90.16% 
α 0.006 6.90 0.000 0.44 
QLG  
β 1.024 23.21 
77.49% 
0.569 
1.018 23.87 
78.16% 
0.857 α 0.000 -0.02 0.000 0.04 
QLV  
β 1.080 22.75 
80.18% 
1.010 25.14 
80.23% 
α -0.002 -0.82 0.000 -0.24 
Group Coeff 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 24m t-stat Rsqrd VG:pval 
QSG  
β 1.019 38.92 
88.70% 
0.053 
0.972 50.75 
92.60% 
0.900 α 0.002 1.69 0.001 0.79 
QSV  
β 0.945 51.66 
92.89% 
0.915 40.39 
90.59% 
α 0.005 5.90 0.001 0.96 
QLG  
β 1.048 24.69 
78.11% 
0.881 
1.046 27.02 
80.58% 
0.882 α 0.000 -0.03 0.000 -0.26 
QLV  
β 1.097 28.85 
82.72% 
1.015 26.24 
82.21% 
α 0.000 -0.26 -0.001 -0.55 
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Appendix 
Correlations between the Mcap, B/M, CF/P, D/P and E/P 
 
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the Mcap, B/M, CF/P, D/P and E/P. These correlations are the 
averages of the yearly correlations over the eighteen years from 1986-2003. Mcap is the Market Capitalisation, B/M is the 
Book to Market ratio, CF/P is the Cash Flow to Price ratio, D/P is the Dividend to Price ratio and E/P is the Earnings to Price 
ratio. 
 
Variables Mcap B/M CF/P D/P E/P 
Mcap 1.00 . . . . 
B/M -0.07 1.00 . . . 
CF/P 0.00 0.33 1.00 . . 
D/P 0.02 0.43 0.42 1.00 . 
E/P 0.02 0.23 0.68 0.31 1.00 
 
 
 
 
